We develop a mixed-duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed of market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low,...

Recent policy discussions have debated whether governments should treat state-owned and private enterprises equally or adopt different policies towards each type of enterprise. Such questions are pertinent for difficult economic climates in which government subsidy towards struggling state-owned...

Hospital markets are often characterised by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of different objectives of the hospitals on quality, profits, and overall welfare in a price regulated duopoly with symmetric...

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm. We also consider endogenous roles by adopting the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)....