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Competition, cooperation, and collective choice
Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2012
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost … foregone. -- public goods ; competition ; tournament ; cooperation ; voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009548053
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Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
Markussen, Thomas - 2012
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102829
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Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
Markussen, Thomas - 2012
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104948
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Coopetition in Group Contest
Kiss, Hubert Janos - 2019
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871693
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Coopetition in group contest
Kiss, Hubert J.; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso; Zhukova, Vita - 2019
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016453
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Communication in Asymmetric Group Competition Over Public Goods
Zhang, Jingjing - 2012
This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal sized groups compete for a prize that is shared equally among members of the winning group, regardless of their (costly) contributions to the group’s success. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170736
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A theory of reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398368
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A Theory of Reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2021
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321364
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760905
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Exclusion in the all-pay auction : an experimental investigation
Fehr, Dietmar; Schmid, Julia - 2014 - Rev.
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of bidders with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403250