This is a Powerpoint presentation. The full article is also available on ssrn at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924831U.S. policymakers often treat market competition as a panacea. However, in the case of mortgage securitization, policymakers' faith in competition is misplaced. Competitive mortgage...

U.S. policymakers often treat market competition as a panacea. However, in the case of mortgage securitization, policymakers' faith in competition is misplaced. Competitive mortgage securitization has been tried three times in U.S. history - during the 1880s, the 1920s, and the 2000s - and every...

This paper presents a simple model that shows the effects of financial liberalization on the credit market of a small, relatively capital poor economy. The empirical evidence regarding the effect of foreign bank entry is mixed. Some studies show that financial liberalization leads to an increase...

The market for project finance loans has a special feature: banks do not only compete individually but also through coalitions or “syndicates”. Traditional concentration indicators summarise industry structure based on individual market shares but they fail to capture the dynamics of...

Using a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric information and differing comparative advantages among lenders, this paper analyzes the impact of lender entry on credit access and aggregate net output. The model shows that lender entry has the potential to create a segmented market that...

Two well-known mechanisms for enhancing managers' accountability are yardstick competition and internal monitoring. Yardstick competition puts managers in direct competition when firms make decisions for re-appointment (Tirole, 2006). Monitoring is used by firms to detect managers' rent-seeking...

We study spatially differentiated competition between charities by partnering with two foodbanks in two neighboring cities to conduct a field experiment with roughly 350 donation appeals. We induce spatial differentiation by varying the observability of charities' location such that each donor...

We report an experimental test of alternative rules in innovation contests when success may not be feasible and contestants may learn from each other. Following Halac et al. (forthcoming), the contest designer can vary the prize allocation rule from Winner-Take-All in which the first successful...

We analyse incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is some noisy ranking of the partners' efforts. This enables us to ensure both first best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output...