This paper provides theoretical explanations for devices that movie distributors use to avoid head-to-head competition. We use a simple static model to show how revenuse sharing exhibition contracts providex multiplex owners with incentives to take cross effects on demand into account. Then we...

We compare a discriminatory pricing regime with a non-discriminatory regime in a competitive bottleneck model where content providers endogenously sort into single or multi-homers. We find that consumer prices rise when the share of single-homers increases in the non-discriminatory case, while...

Newspaper Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs) are long term, inflexible contracts between metropolitan daily newspapers in the same market. These contracts maintain two editorial voices while combining all business operations of the two competitors in order to capture many of the scale economies...

In this paper, we empirically study the effect of entry on product repositioning, differentiation, and variety. Using a rich panel data set on theaters' weekly screening schedules, we provide evidence that the degree of differentiation between theaters in a local market rises after entry of new...

Does editorial competition boost newspaper circulation? If metropolitan daily newspapers constitute relevant product and geographic markets, then competition should foster improved quality and offer readers products that are differentiated in some dimensions and thus should result in higher...

We investigate how competition in product niches affects the ultimate timing of product release for experience goods using data on motion pictures in the United States. We identify product niches that movies occupy along three different product dimensions: common actor, common director, and...

We investigate how competition in product niches affects the ultimate timing of product release for experience goods using data on motion pictures in the United States. We identify product niches that movies occupy along three different product dimensions: common actor, common director, and...

This paper studies asymmetric platforms' incentives for enforcing exclusivity on multihoming sellers. We show that exclusivity benefits a platform only when its service is not very valuable to sellers, and hence can be initiated by a weak platform rather than the stronger one. It is possible for...

This essay reviews and synthesizes some recent literature on the competitive effects of exclusive dealing agreements. I outline various procompetitive rationales for the practice including the non-dilution of incentives, protection of relationship-specific investments, and the elimination of...

We develop a model for two-sided markets with consumers and producers, who interact through a platform. Typical settings for the model are the market for smartphones with phone users, app producers, and smartphone operating systems; or the video game market with game players, video game...