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We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm's performance and more for their rivals' performance if an industry's firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...
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When one firm's strategy affects other firms' value, optimal executive incentives depend on whether shareholders have interests in only one or in multiple firms. Performance-sensitive contracts induce managerial effort to reduce costs, and lower costs induce higher output. Hence, greater...
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We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownershipaffects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes varia-tion in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industryand intra-firm cross-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011747733
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477278
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