mechanisms for bank risk-taking studied in a large partial equilibrium literature. We show that competitive equilibriums maximize … banks is higher than that of banks enjoying monopoly rents, and is robust to the introduction of social costs of bank … failures. In this model, there is no trade-off between bank competition and financial stability. -- general equilibrium ; bank …

the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale …, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results …

mechanisms for bank risk-taking studied in a large partial equilibrium literature. We show that competitive equilibriums maximize … banks is higher than that of banks enjoying monopoly rents, and is robust to the introduction of social costs of bank … failures. In this model, there is no trade-off between bank competition and financial stability …

banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank … allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large …