I show that in any symmetric Nash equilibrium of Hotelling's pure location game, as the number of firms becomes large, the limiting distribution of market shares converges to a Gamma(2,2) distribution. Remarkably, this is true regardless of the distribution of consumers. The proof for the...

I find that interconnection might cause the market to be less competitive, and might lead to an increase in the price firms charge for their product. Absent interconnection, firms compete for a consumer for two reasons. The first reason is to obtain revenue from selling the product to a consumer...

This paper shows that Stackelberg has turned the Cournot competitors into monopolists, to result in Bertrand's equilibrium, and to fall into a prisoner's dilemma. This paper then applies Hotelling's theory to break the dilemma

This article provides a tractable model of inter-temporal price-discrimination by heterogeneous firms, imperative for our understanding of advance purchase markets in the wake of entry. The pricing schedule of a more efficient entrant is found to differ systematically from the pricing schedule...

This paper extends the traditional Hotelling's model of spatial competition by allowing firms to choose the degree of general purposeness of their products before they compete in prices. The degree of general purposeness is approximated by endogenizing the per-unit transportation cost...

This paper sheds light on a recent empirical controversy about the effect of competition on price discrimination in airline markets (Borenstein and Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro, (2009)). We introduce individual demand uncertainty into Hotelling’s model of horizontal product differentiation...

This paper sheds light on an empirical controversy about the effect of competition on price discrimination. We introduce individual demand uncertainty into Hotelling’s model of product differentiation and show that firms offer advance purchase discounts. Consumers choose between an early...

There are examples of entry in two-sided markets, where first entrants occupy a ‘central location’ and serve agents with ‘intermediate tastes,’ while later entrants are niche players. Why would the first entrant choose to become a ‘general’ platform, given that later entrants will...

This paper sheds light on a recent empirical controversy about the effect of competition on price discrimination in airline markets (Borenstein and Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro, (2009)). We introduce individual demand uncertainty into Hotelling’s model of horizontal product differentiation...