In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior...

This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluation and in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence of technological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry. We find that the principal reacts to...

This paper investigates the factors that make teams successful in competitive environments. In collaboration with a medium-sized Latin-American bank, we designed a series of contests among the branches of the bank, in which we varied the prize structure of the tournaments (in some tournaments,...

The paper provides a framework for analysis of remuneration to agents whose task is to make well-informed decisions on behalf of a principal, with managers in large corporations as the most prominent example. The principal and agent initially bargain over the pay scheme to the latter. The...

We analyze competition through incentive contracts for managers in duopoly. Privately informed managers exert surplus enhancing effort that generates an externality on the rival. Asymmetric information on imperfectly correlated shocks creates a two-way distortion of efforts under strategic...

We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for managerial talent. Adding a disutility of social comparison as induced by a ranking of verifiable efforts to the multi-task model by Bénabou and Tirole (2016), we demonstrate that...

Contrary to mainstream opinion, suggesting that dominant online platforms compete on their own merits and that their abuse of the large-scale accumulation of data should fall under data or privacy laws, this article argues that competition law should investigate whether global platform...

In economic contests or tournaments where monitoring of the actions taken by contestants is imperfect competition is likely to drive not just work effort but other choices at the workers' discretion that increase the probability of winning. For example, when workers compete for promotion,...

In many markets, such as video streaming or information services, a consumer may purchase multiple competing products or services. The existing theoretical literature typically assumes that each consumer can buy only one product. This paper explicitly models the consumer's multi-purchase...

In the idealized world of theoretical microeconomics, in a perfect competition scenario, identical atomistic producers are assumed to be producing identical fungible goods and compete with each other on price, conceptually leapfrogging the sale price downwards (sometimes in one straight jump)...