Administrative enforcement of China's Anti-Monopoly Law is shared among three ministries, and a pan-ministry commission sits above these ministries to coordinate competition policy. This two-tiered tripartite enforcement structure has been criticized as inefficient, costly, and ineffective. In...

This article considers how electricity utility regulators should treat infrastructure investments related to electric vehicles. It begins by analyzing investments using traditional utility regulatory policy norms. Next, the article analyzes whether utility regulators should broaden their...

Informal monitors can sometimes substitute for formal law enforcement. Monitors hired to minimize cheating, however, are themselves vulnerable to collusion and extortion. I focus on one such informal monitor – the fair authorities at the trade fairs at Champagne – asking why the fairs...

We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests, Lazear-Rosen tournaments and all-pay contests as special cases, among others. We show that the optimal contest has an...

We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instruments to redress the lack of...

This paper builds a new model of financial exchange competition, tailored to the institutional details of the modern US stock market. In equilibrium, exchange trading fees are competitive but exchanges are able to earn economic profits from the sale of speed technology. We document stylized...

I construct an efficient game of competition for insurance markets with adverse selection. In the game, each company offers two menus of contracts: a public menu and a private menu. The union of all the public menus needs to be offered by every active company in the market. A private menu...

Multiple candidates (senders) compete over an exogenous number of jobs. There are different tasks in which the candidates' unobservable ability determines their probability of success. We study a signaling game with multiple senders each choosing one task to perform, and one receiver who...

We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy...

We examine an endogenous, sunk budget extension of Myerson's (1993) two-candidate model of political competition in which candidates simultaneously allocate an exogenous level of a use-it-or-lose-it persuasive advertising resource across a homogeneous electorate of unit measure. We completely...