We analyze an oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and qualities. The quality of a product is not known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price-signaling competition. There are two regimes for separating...

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about the qualities of their respective proposals, which are positively correlated. The information externality -- that the news disclosed by one sender...

I study optimal information provision by a search goods seller. While the seller controls a consumer's pre-search information, which decides whether she will engage in costly search for the product, he cannot control her post-search information because the consumer would inevitably learn the...

A characteristic of many information markets is that consumers can cross-check information, i.e. observe several information sources. To explore this we build a model of market for information where information outlets can only report a coarse signal and face a distribution of consumers with...