Loyalty discounts, offered to customers that meet purchase thresholds, can shift share from rival firms. In a differentiated product duopoly, only one firm employs a program that customers adopt in equilibrium. Whenever consumers strongly prefer the product of said firm, such discounts increase...

This paper studies the impact of a dominant firm's conditional discounts on competitors' learning-by-doing. In a vertical context where a dominant upstream supplier and a competitive fringe sell their products to a single downstream firm, we analyze whether the dominant supplier prefers to off...

The controversial debate on the appropriate standard for the assessment of bundled discounts echoes the difficulties encountered by courts, antitrust authorities and scholars in their ongoing attempt to develop a coherent theoretical framework to distinguish exclusionary conduct from legitimate...

This paper studies asymmetric platforms' incentives for enforcing exclusivity on multihoming sellers. We show that exclusivity benefits a platform only when its service is not very valuable to sellers, and hence can be initiated by a weak platform rather than the stronger one. It is possible for...

There are well-documented episodes for which prices remained at supracompetitive levels even after a cartel had been shut down by the competition authority. As long as market conditions remain reasonably stable, it is quite possible that collusive prices will still be incentive compatible so the...

This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competition law. It does so by bringing together several strands of the case law (and this across all provisions, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and merger control). The analysis is structured around a...

This paper analyses how the endogenous detection of an upstream cartel by a down-stream buyer allows the detecting firm to raise rivals' cost. We model a market with a vertical structure, where a stable all-inclusive cartel is operating in the upstream market which provides an input to a...

This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm's profit depends on the rival’s exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the...

In this Article we focus upon an area in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress competition. Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other jurisdictions have taken strong...