Showing 1 - 10 of 10,234
effort and sabotage on a prize set by a principal) is extended to allow for coalitions. Using a sequential coalition … formation model with a coalition externality (larger coalitions make self-enforcing sabotage and synergy strategies more … effective), coalition members coordinate their sabotage-synergy activities. Our main result is a sufficient condition for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072263
A large empirical literature found that the correlation between insurance purchase and ex post realization of risk is … in a negative correlation in equilibrium between insurance coverage and ex post realization of risk. We show that if the … correlation property in equilibrium, unless there is a sufficiently high loading factor. If the insurance market is monopolistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980144
A large empirical literature found that the correlation between insurance purchase and ex post realization of risk is … in a negative correlation in equilibrium between insurance coverage and ex post realization of risk. We show that if the … correlation property in equilibrium, unless there is a sufficiently high loading factor. If the insurance market is monopolistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455907
A large empirical literature found that the correlation between insurance purchase and ex post realization of risk is … in a negative correlation in equilibrium between insurance coverage and ex post realization of risk. We show that if the … correlation property in equilibrium, unless there is a sufficiently high loading factor. If the insurance market is monopolistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980824
In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is analyzed, where each contestant may spend productive effort in order to increase his team's performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that sabotaging the weaker members of a team always decreases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366553
Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419870
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012436059
out actual competitive activities. This paper investigates players' incentives to conduct such pre-contest communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119001
This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal … different in this control treatment. Cheap talk communication thus completely solves miscoordination within groups and makes … group members act as a single agent. Furthermore, it is the larger group that benefits from communication at the expense of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170736
-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication … granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299618