We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives...

We develop a model of competition between interconnected networks, with separate local and long-distance markets, allowing for various degrees of symmetry between carriers. Assuming two part pricing, we show that effective competition can be achieved with simple regulations involving mandatory...

The best proposals for network neutrality rules are simple. They ban abusive behavior like tollboothing and outright blocking and degradation. And they leave open legitimate network services that the Bells and Cable operators want to provide, such as offering cable television services and voice...

I generalize the workhorse model of network competition (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a,b) to include income effects in call demand. Income effects imply that call demand depends also on the subscription fee, not only on the call price. In the standard case of differentiated...

This note demonstrates that the puzzling profit neutrality of access charges, i.e., the networks' profits are independent of the access charge with two-part call tariffs, depends crucially on a specific property of subscription demand. Profit neutrality is equivalent to the subscription...

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure iinvestments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges firms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay first investment....