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This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms' lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential … game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying … coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072069
An organization must decide which proposals to fund. In evaluating the proposals, the organization may rely on those applying for funding to produce evidence about the merits of their own proposals. We consider the role of a capacity constraint preventing the organization from funding all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295651
We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295655
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Contests are well-established mechanisms for political lobbying, innovation, rentseeking, incentivizing workers, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012426931
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total … departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The … antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514012
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We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying … optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621453