In Book IX of his History of Rome (written around 25 BC) Titus Livy speculates about a hypothetical confrontation between Rome and Alexander the Great. What if Alexander had not died at the end of the Asian campaign but had returned to Europe to attack Rome? Livy argues that Rome and Carthage...

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) oversees nearly every aspect of the $11 billion college sports industry. Its powers include scheduling championship events, determining eligibility rules, entering into commercial contracts, and punishing members that refuse to follow its...

The principle of effectiveness is closely related to the development of the emerging EU law on remedies. Its instrumental use has enabled the EU courts to restrict the principle of national procedural autonomy, when this was convenient in order to ensure the accomplishment of the aims set by EU...

This paper discusses the judgment of the EU General Court of 12 June 2014 in the Intel case. It argues that the EU case-law on the use of exclusivity rebate systems by undertakings occupying a dominant position is economically sound, and that the criticism directed at this case-law is ill-founded

The present paper analyzes the interaction between the economic review of the probition of abuses of a dominant position (Article 82 EC) on the one hand and the efforts to enhance private enforcement of competition law through private damage claims on the other hand. The paper argues that...

This article discusses two elements that the draft EU Directive on actions for damages treats only perfunctorily. The first concerns lucrum cessans or the quantity effect which is found to be of a relatively higher magnitude than the price effect. The second concerns the difficulties of...

In competition law, the problem of the optimal design of institutional and procedural rules concerns assessment processes of the pro- and anticompetitiveness of business behaviors. This is well recognized in the discussion about the relative merits of different assessment principles such as the...

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions – phase-1 remedies...

We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information in which mergers can be cleared after a first phase of investigation. We find that the enforceability of clearance decisions at the end of the first phase is unattractive to the extent that it prevents the...