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Chapter 15 Antitrust
Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007
This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495
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Horizontal merger analysis
Kaplow, Louis - 2020
Economic analysis of competition regulation is most developed in the domain of horizontal mergers, and modern agency guidelines reflect a substantial consensus on the appropriate template for merger assessment. Nevertheless, official protocols are understood to rest on a problematic market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428221
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Chapter 36 Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers
Whinston, Michael D. - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 3, (pp. 2369-2440). 2007
Recently there has been a notable increase in interest in antitrust law in much of the world. This chapter discusses antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers, the area of antitrust that has seen some of the most dramatic improvements in both economic tools and the application of economics in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024580
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Actions Speak Louder than Words : econometric evidence to target tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets
Andreoli Versbach, Patrick; Franck, Jens-Uwe - 2013
Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust enforcement which greatly depends on evidence of explicit communication. We propose to target specific elements of firms' behavior that facilitate tacit collusion by providing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009777055
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Policy innovations, political preferences, and cartel prosecutions
Ghosal, Vivek; Sokol, D. Daniel - 2015
-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties … imposed across the policy regimes. The more recent regimes are characterized by far fewer cartels prosecuted, but with … cartels to larger and multinational firms. In terms of political effects, our results reveal no clear inter-political party …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346282
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Gender and collusion
Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866
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Gender and collusion
Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886259
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Partial cartels and mergers with heterogenous firms : experimental evidence
Gomez-Martinez, Francisco - 2017
A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive … experimentally the formation and behavior of partial cartels. The theoretical model is a variation of Bos and Harrington's (2010 … experimental study has two main objectives. The first goal is examine whether partial cartels emerge in the lab at all, and if so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761059
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R&D spillovers and cartelization of industries with differentiated products
Prokop, Jacek; Karbowski, Adam - 2018
The objective of this article is to investigate the impact of research and development (R&D) spillovers on cartelization of industries characterized by differentiated products. For simplicity, we focus on the duopoly market in which firms compete according to the Stackelberg leadership model....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011904589
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Entry deterrence through cooperative R&D over-investment
Christin, Clémence - 2011
In this paper, we highlight new conditions under which R&D agreements may have anti-competitive effects. We focus on cases where two firms compete with each other and with a competitive fringe. R&D activities need a specific input available to all firms on a common market, the price of which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307559