A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive …) model where firms are heterogeneous in terms of production capacities and individual cartel decisions are endogenized. The …, which firms are part of it. The second aim of the experiment is to study the coordinated effects of a merger when partial …

cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his … large sample of historical cartel overcharges; the advisability of trimming outliers or large estimates from the sample …% presumption; and the implications of the average cartel overcharges results for optimal deterrence and antitrust policy …

antitrust regulation against cartel in the absence and presence of merger regulations. We find that in our model, regulation … that in absence of any penalty on cartel, a firm always prefers a cartel to merger, when the latter does not involve any … concentration among the competitive fringe lowers the profitability of merger as compared to cartel. We then discuss the impact of …