The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the analysis of competition in the communications...

Advocates of traditional antitrust are increasingly called upon to the defend the existing framework. In doing so they face a challenge: the traditional framework is actually quite difficult to explain. The problem is not that modern antitrust involves a lot of advanced economics — though that...

Monopolization, in the United States, and abuse of dominance, in the European Union, embody different philosophies about how best to police single firm conduct in competition law. Surprisingly, their disagreement ends at market definition. Both doctrines define relevant markets by similar...

Entry analysis and potential competition doctrine have much in common. Both draw from predictions about future entry. Both require difficult assessments of entry barriers and incentives. Both are currently a doctrinal mess. This Article offers a clarifying perspective. Instead of separating...

This paper uses the framework of aggregation and separation that Lee Fennell develops in Slices and Lumps to discuss two fundamental questions of antitrust policy. First, how far does the lumpiness of trading partners dictate the limits of antitrust policy? Second, what does antitrust miss under...

Antitrust analysis is famously complex, fact intensive, and time consuming. But should we aspire for it to be otherwise? I offer two cautionary conjectures in opposition to the search for simpler rules. First, I conjecture that efforts to convert vague antitrust standards into clear rules will...