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A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"><![CDATA[${\cal L}_{C}$]]></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (resp., <InlineEquation ID="Equ2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"><![CDATA[$\wp_{C})$]]></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>
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The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.
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