Similar Search Results

Trust and reputation under asymmetric information

Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020 - Version: September 10, 2020

We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494

Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587361

An Experimental Investigation of Reputation Effects of Disclosure in an Investment / Trust Game

Lunawat, Radhika - 2020

This paper examines experimentally the reputation building role of disclosure in an investment / trust game. It …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200864

Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication

Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - 2009

can be sustained by reputation motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests between sellers and buyers. In the … absence of “commitment” types, reputation motives are explained as a consequence of equilibrium interplay between the market …, reputation motives do not disappear even after the seller’s ability is revealed. This model is applied to examine the extent to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203351

The Role of Social Esteem in the Trust Game With Preemptive Signaling

Boulu-Reshef, Béatrice; Kuechle, Graciela - 2023

Principal-agent interactions in which the agent can preemptively signal prosociality can achieve higher levels of trust and reciprocity if both parties care about social esteem (Boulu-Reshef and Kuechle, 2023). However, it is unclear to what extent social esteem is necessary for this outcome. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347169

Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams

Crutzen, Benoît S.Y.; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2007

Organization differ in the degree to which they differentiate employees by ability. We analyse how the effect of differentiation on employee morale may explain this variation. By comparing employees using ordinary talk, a manager boosts the self-image of some, but hurts that of others. Whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325162

Social relationships and trust

Binzel, Christine; Fehr, Dietmar - 2010

While social relationships play an important role for individuals to cope with missing market institutions, they also limit individuals' range of trading partners. This paper aims at understanding the determinants of trust at various social distances when information asymmetries are present....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003968672

Social relationships and trust

Binzel, Christine; Fehr, Dietmar - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003973633

The benefit of anonymity in public goods games

Hugh-Jones, David; Reinstein, David - 2010

Previous work has found that in social dilemmas, the selfish always free-ride, while others will cooperate if they expect their peers to do so as well. Outcomes may thus depend on conditional cooperators’ beliefs about the number of selfish types. An early round of the game may be played...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955221

Guilt from promise-breaking and trust in markets for expert services : theory and experiment

Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - 2010

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert’s provision and charging decisions. We argue that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944278

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last