We develop a model in which an overconfident agent learns about groups in society from observations of his and others' successes. In our model, both the agent's information and his beliefs are multi-dimensional, allowing us to study interactions between different views. Overall, society always...

In this study, we examine how information provision affects the degree of overconfidence using an online experiment. The 4,210 experimental participants engaged in stock market prediction exercises were asked to evaluate their absolute and relative performance. We conducted a randomized...

Overconfident behavior, the excessive willingness to bet on one’s performance, may be driven by optimistic beliefs and/or ambiguity attitudes. Separating these factors is key for understanding and correcting overconfident behavior, as they may call for different corrective actions. We present...

We explore theoretically and experimentally whether information design can be used by trustees as a signaling device to boost trusting acts in once-off interactions. In our main setting, a trustee partially or fully decides a binary payoff allocation and designs an information structure, then a...

We empirically assess whether hindsight bias has consequences on how citizens evaluate their political actors. Using an incentivized elicitation technique, we demonstrate that people systematically misremember their past policy preferences regarding how to best fight the Covid-19 pandemic. At...

This paper examines the relationship between competition and efficiency in a market in which incentive contracts are offered to overconfident agents. The context is a labor market in which worker effort is not observed by firms (moral hazard), workers have private information about their...