We develop a model in which an overconfident agent learns about groups in society from observations of his and others' successes. In our model, both the agent's information and his beliefs are multi-dimensional, allowing us to study interactions between different views. Overall, society always...

We explore theoretically and experimentally whether information design can be used by trustees as a signaling device to boost trusting acts in once-off interactions. In our main setting, a trustee partially or fully decides a binary payoff allocation and designs an information structure, then a...

Overconfident behavior, the excessive willingness to bet on one’s performance, may be driven by optimistic beliefs and/or ambiguity attitudes. Separating these factors is key for understanding and correcting overconfident behavior, as they may call for different corrective actions. We present...

We study trust building in credence goods markets in a dynamic setting. An extreme lemon problem arises in the one-shot game and results in no trade. In the repeated game, an expert's honesty is monitored through consumers' rejection of his recommendations. We characterize the optimal...

We provide a preference-based rationale for endogenous overconfidence. Horizon-dependent risk aversion, combined with a possibility to forget, can generate overconfidence and excessive risk taking in equilibrium. An "anxiety prone" agent, who is more risk-averse to imminent than to distant...