We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …

-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the …-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the … resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource …

advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … more rent-dissipative than innate/uncontestable advantage. Therefore, Pyrrhic victories should be more common for contests …

The category of conflict encompasses not only war but also crime, litigation, strikes and lockouts, and redistributive … politics. Exchange theory and conflict theory constitute two coequal branches of economic analysis, the first based upon … conflict are reviewed. Preferences, opportunities, and perceptions are shown to determine the choice between conflict and …