Showing 1 - 10 of 531
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001663190
In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405864
In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320669
Researchers of group creativity have noted problems such as social loafing, "production blocking," and especially, evaluation apprehension (Paulus, 2000). Thus, brainstorming techniques have specifically admonished people "not to criticize" their own and others' ideas, a tenet that has gone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075605
This paper looks at society divided into two groups where personal assets as well as group specific values influences the individuals' utility (positively for own group's value and possibly otherwise for the other group's value). Individual resource allocation problem may lead to under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279150
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578010
This paper analyzes a dynamic lobbying model in which two antagonistic lobbies compete with each other for a prize over two time periods that are linked through status quo bias. The attacker has to decide whether to attempt an attack on the status quo already in the first period or whether to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061264
We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176463
This paper analyzes a model in which two groups compete with each other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: Yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group, if there is a fight today. Hence, a change of the status quo has long term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063789
This paper provides the results of an empirical study of empirical research on of the conflict within teams. The ability to face the conflict and to resolve problems efficiently is the most important factor for the success or failure of a group. Conflict is a powerful instrument of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014177612