In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised,...

This paper looks at society divided into two groups where personal assets as well as group specific values influences the individuals' utility (positively for own group's value and possibly otherwise for the other group's value). Individual resource allocation problem may lead to under...

We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any...

This paper analyzes a model in which two groups compete with each other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: Yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group, if there is a fight today. Hence, a change of the status quo has long term...

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling/ Nozic/Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A...

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict....

The article aims at suggesting possible conjectures on Al-Qaeda's logic and structure. Even if the organization's secrecy makes any empirical evidence difficult to find, some insight can be provided by economic theory of contests: in this terms, Al-Qaeda can be acknowledged like an agent...

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents conflict in order to appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. An institutional constraint is modelled through an exogenously fixed element as a feature of a modified Contest...