This paper tries to analyze the interrelationship between possibilities of conflict in cross border mergers and acquisitions and firm and market characteristics in a two country three firm model. We show that in general an increase in asymmetry across firms reduces the possibility of conflict...

We introduce a common-pool contest into a continuous-time, differential game setting to model the dynamic behavior of agents facing a trade-off between socially productive activities and appropriation. We are able to identify multiple Markov perfect equilibrium strategies that are nonlinear in a...

The analysis of previous studies oncerning corporate governance shows that some variables related to board behavior have not been properly taken into account. The paper analyses board of directors in its decision-making process highlighting the importance that a clear identification of conflict...

This paper provides robust evidence on feedback effects of violent conflicts on firm growth. It uses South Asian firm level data that contain rare employment information on countries that experience severe conflicts. We show that firm growth exists in conflict areas. Yet, there are fewer...

This paper conducts the analysis of conflict and appropriation by extending the static contest models such as Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Skaperdas (1992) to a continuoustime, differential game setting. This paper shows that there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) strategy, which may...

This paper presents an extension of a static model of economic conflict analyzed by Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Skaperdas (1992) to an infinite horizon differential game. Our aim is to highlight the strategic role of appropriation among a smaller group of agents in an intertemporal context. The...

Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood...

Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood...

Victorious alliances often fi ght about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fi ght against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions...