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Group bargaining and conflict
Quérou, Nicolas - 2010
protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747115
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Group Bargaining and Conflict
Querou, Nicolas - 2010
protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189169
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Settlement under the threat of conflict : the cost of asymmetric information
Sjöberg, Eric - 2014
I study a situation where two players disagree on the division of a good. In the first of two stages, the players can divide the good peacefully between them by signing a contract. If either or both players reject the contract, they must engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337007
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Intimidation : Linking Negotiation and Conflict
Ghosh, Sambuddha; Gratton, Gabriele; Shen, Caixia - 2018
costless. Therefore non-concession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the … shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, the rejected offer determines how conflict is played if negotiations fail. In turn …, how players are expected to play during conflict determines their negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036192
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Bargaining and War : On the Communication Equilibrium in Conflict Games
Park, Youngseok; Campbell, Colin - 2022
We present a version of Baliga and Sjöström’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players contemplate whether to take an active engagement action to compel the leader of a neighboring state (an extremist) to give up his risky weapons. We show that a player with greater...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093382
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Optimism and commitment : an elementary theory of bargaining and war
Ponsatí, Clara; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 157-179
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506420
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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2015
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
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Conflict in roles : lying to the in-group versus the out-group in negotiations
Glac, Katherina; Warren, Danielle E.; Chen, Chao-Chuan - In: Business & society 53 (2014) 3, pp. 440-460
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010381313
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The foundations of game theory
Dimand, Mary Ann (contributor);  … - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000609793
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Cooling-off in negotiations : does it work?
Oechssler, Joerg (contributor); Roider, Andreas (contributor) - 2008
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747328