We investigate the implications of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) for interstate confl ict. We set up a two-stage game with three competing importers, where fi rst, two of the countries decide on whether to initiate war against each other, and subsequently, all three countries select their...

The present study explores the theory of conglomerate conflict behavior (Van de Vliert, 1997). This theory presumes that conflict behaviors should not be studied as if independent, but as 'gestalts', that is, in relation to each other. Behavioral conglomerates vary in the specific combinations...

We model a rent-seeking contest among two "identity ideologues", differentially located along a uni-dimensional identity continuum, and a "mercenary", who can choose any location in-between. The contest jointly awards an identity-relevant good ("religion") and an identity-irrelevant good...

We model a rent-seeking contest among two 'identity ideologues', differentially located along a uni-dimensional identity continuum, and a 'mercenary', who can choose any location in-between. The contest jointly awards an identity-relevant good ('religion') and an identity-irrelevant good...

In this paper, we explore two factors that can limit arming and, more generally, the costs of enforcement within and across states: governance or the formal organizations and institutions that help define and enforce property rights, and norms, or the informal arrangements in settling potential...

How do the outcomes of international wars affect domestic social change? In turn, how do changing patterns of social identification and domestic conflict affect a nation's military capability? Models that link structural variables, power politics, and the individuals that constitute states are...

This project studies collaboration in highly skilled, nationally diverse teams. An unexpected international political conflict makes national diversity more salient among existing and potential team members. I exploit this natural experiment to quantify the role of social, identity-driven, costs...

Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. With it, the victor ensures greater allegiance of the wider population, increasing their rents at the expense of their enemy. Such reputational concerns generate two motives for conflict. When only victory or defeat is...

Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. With it, the victor ensures greater allegiance of the wider population, increasing their rents at the expense of their enemy. Such reputational concerns generate two motives for conflict. When only victory or defeat is...