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This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...
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We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players’ abilities are stochastic, but become … sequential contests with the same opponent (multi-battle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show … ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. …
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We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...
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