This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...

This volume of Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development includes some of the selected papers presented by scholars in a European Peace Science Network Meeting recently held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Chapters in this volume cover the conflicts in Maoist India,...

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The...

Intro -- Contents -- Series Foreword -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Strategic Aspects of Fighting in Alliances -- 2 Fiscal Equalization and Political Conflict -- 3 Natural Resources, Social Conflict, and Poverty Trap -- 4 A Game of Thrones: Power Structure and the Stability of Regimes -- 5 The...