We analyze Nash equilibrium in time of use of a congested facility. Users are risk averse with general concave utility. Queues are subject to varying degrees of random sorting, ranging from strict queue priority to a completely random queue. We define the key “no residual queue” property,...

We analyse Nash equilibrium in time of use of a congested facility. Users are risk averse with general concave utility. Queues are subject to varying degrees of random sorting, ranging from strict queue priority to a completely random queue. We define the key "no residual queue" property, which...

This paper considers a congested bottleneck. A fast lane reserves a more than proportional share of capacity to a designated group of travelers. Travelers are otherwise identical and other travelers can use the reserved capacity when it would otherwise be idle. The paper shows that such a fast...

This paper analyses a tax reform, explicitly conceived by policy makers to be climate-friendly, that partly replaces a high vehicle registration tax by road user charging and allows for differentiation of the remaining registration tax by fuel efficiency. A microeconomic framework is proposed to...

Urban congestion causes travel times to exhibit considerable variability, which leads to coordination problems when people have to meet. We analyze a game for the timing of a meeting between two players who must each complete a trip of random duration to reach the meeting, which does not begin...

The rationale for congestion charges is that by internalising the marginal external congestion cost, they restore efficiency in the transport market. In the canonical model underlying this view, congestion is a static phenomenon, users are taken to be homogenous, there is no travel time risk,...