The paper argues that much of the theoretical work on consumer choice theory during the first third of the twentieth century actually addressed some of the same issues discussed in contemporary behavioral economics. This is not generally recognized because the discussion was tied up with the...

This paper examines elements of the complex place/role/influence of psychology in the history of consumer choice theory. The paper reviews, and then challenges, the standard narrative that psychology was "in" consumer choice theory early in the neoclassical revolution, then strictly "out" during...

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

We explain why a durable-goods monopolist would like to create a shortage in the marketplace.We argue that this incentive arises from the presence of a second-hand market and uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for the good. Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations. Moreover,...

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing and "waiting" strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We...

I characterize the menu of bundles (price-quantity combinations) offered by a monopolist when consumers can buy several bundles, share bundles with others, or do both, in a two-type setting. I find that although perfect arbitrage prevents any price discrimination, partial arbitrage in the form...

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We show when the...