We analyze platform competition where user data is collected to improve adtargeting. Considering that users incur privacy costs, we show that the equilibrium level of data provision is distorted and can be inefficiently high or low: if overall competition is weak or if targeting benefits are...

We propose a general framework for consumer demand in two-sided markets, modelling the way externalities between customer groups affect the price sensitivity of demand on both sides of the market. We define a measure for the strength of the externalities and establish the conditions for the...

We assess how the advent of smartphones affected consumer switching costs in the mobile communications market, using data from two surveys conducted in South Korea. A nested logit random utility model is employed to explain consumers' choice over service type and carrier, and to estimate...

We analyze entry of a firm with a new and differentiated product into a market with two properties: An existing incumbent has a captive consumer base, and all consumers have heterogeneous tastes. The interaction of the share of captive consumers with the degree of taste heterogeneity leads to...

This paper studies the implications of consumer misperception in a market for a (horizontally) differentiated product. Two distinct type of misperceptions are considered: (i) a common misperception that leads consumers to similarly overestimate the benefit from both firms' products; and (ii) a...

The next generation of e-commerce will be conducted by digital agents, based on algorithms that will not only make purchase recommendations, but will also predict what we want, make purchase decisions, negotiate and execute the transaction for the consumers, and even automatically form...

Neil Averitt and Robert Lande have for some time been writing about consumer choice as a new paradigm for antitrust. In this comment, I both praise and extend the consumer choice paradigm and provide concrete examples of both cutting edge and familiar antitrust issues where consumer choice can...

We model a two-sided market with heterogeneous customers and two heterogeneous network effects. In our model, customers on each market side care differently about both the number and the type of customers on the other side. Examples of two-sided markets are online platforms or daily newspapers....

We analyze entry of a firm with a new and differentiated product into a market with two properties: An existing incumbent has a captive consumer base, and all consumers have heterogeneous tastes. The interaction of the share of captive consumers with the degree of taste heterogeneity leads to...

Retailers act as both customers and competitors for brand manufacturers when selling private label in direct competition with brands. This paper considers whether retailers exploit this double-agent position to practice switch marketing, manipulating elements of the retail marketing mix to...