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We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a … feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize … the experiment. Our model includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is feasible; however …
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We present a model of persuasive signalling, where a privately-informed sender selects from a class of signals with different precision to persuade a receiver to take one of two actions. The sender's information could be either favourable or unfavourable. The receiver observes both the sender's...
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We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesianpersuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise (a la Blackwell) is always harmful forthe information designer, i.e., the sender. We show that in general this is not the case. Weprovide a...
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We develop a model where the speaker obtains information about which they can lie to persuade the audience. The option to lie, when exercised on the equilibrium path, incentivizes the speaker to seek more persuasive information. However, the conditions under which this happens are surprisingly...
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