In recent years, concerns about misinformation in the media have skyrocketed. President Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed that various news outlets are disseminating "fake news" for political purposes. But when the information contained in mainstream media news reports provides no clear clues...

Public policies that intervene or restrict consumer choices for the benefit of the society are often controversial. For instance, the compliance rate of COVID-19 pandemic social distancing rules varied dramatically across cities and states, and these policies even backfired among some consumers...

We study a model of Bayesian persuasion in which Receiver has limited information-processing capacity, or attention, and must exert costly effort to process Sender's signals. Receiver is rationally inattentive (Sims (2003)): attention costs are proportional to the mutual information (expected...

We report the results of an experiment to systematically investigate the influence of different settings in credence good markets on opportunism in the sellers' decisions. We find that, as predicted by a cognitive dissonance model, the specific choice of the design features might be less...

We investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs. In a standard die-rolling experiment, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which mediate the focus of a person on their private and public selves, respectively. First, we...

Although the elderly are more vulnerable to COVID-19, the empirical evidence suggests that they do not behave more cautiously in the pandemic than younger individuals. This theoretical model argues that some individuals might not comply with the COVID-19 measures to reassure themselves that they...

Do people only reject interference and keep control in order to affect the outcome? We find that 20% of subjects reject unrequired help and insist on their solution to a problem - although doing so is costly and does not change the result. We tease out the motives by varying the information...

We study optimal contracting by a monopolistic seller of an investment good to a time-inconsistent consumer and, in doing so, introduce asymmetric information to the model of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). We find: (1) the below-marginal-cost-pricing rule may fail for a low-value consumer;...

Sellers often make explicit or implicit product claims without providing evidence. We show that such "puffery" of product attributes through pure cheap talk can be credible and help buyers make a better decision. Puffing one attribute of a product leads buyers to positively update their...

We present a model of persuasive signalling, where a privately-informed sender selects from a class of signals with different precision to persuade a receiver to take one of two actions. The sender's information could be either favourable or unfavourable. The receiver observes both the sender's...