A monopolist uses prices as an instrument to influence consumers' belief about the unknown quality of its product. Consumers observe prices and sales in earlier periods to learn about the product. Every period they decide whether to consume the product or to wait for a lower price in future. We...

This paper studies an information design problem in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers, whose valuation of firm's products is uncertain, observe a noisy signal about the valuation upon being matched with a firm. The goal is to characterize those signal structures that maximize...

We examine voluntary disclosure when the firm (“sender”) is risk-averse and uncertain about audience preferences. We show that some firms stay silent in equilibrium, in contrast to classic “unravelling” results. Silence reduces the sensitivity of a firm's payoff to audiences'...

We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an...

We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type), and a gain-loss valuation that depends on...

This study explores how information helps housing consumers make informed decisions and discusses potential market outcomes. We analyse the interaction between the disclosure of information on property conditions and the disparity between home sellers' willingness to accept (WTA) and home...

Technology adoption often occurs sequentially, so that later potential adopters can see the decisions (adopt or not adopt) of earlier potential adopters. In this paper we review the literature on observational learning, in which people use information gained by observing the behavior of others...

We consider an information design problem when the sender faces ambiguity regarding the probability distribution over the states of the world, the utility function and the prior of the receiver. The solution concept is minimax loss (regret), that is, the sender minimizes the distance from the...

This article is about a market for credence goods. With a credence good, consumers are never sure about the extent of the good they actually need. Therefore, sellers act as experts determining the customers' requirements. This information asymmetry between buyers and sellers obviously creates...

Mere observation of others' choices can be informative about product quality. This paper develops an individual-level dynamic model of observational learning, and applies it to a novel data set from the U.S. kidney market where transplant candidates on a waiting list sequentially decide whether...