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In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850332
public goods experiment in which subjects were induced with the motives of Care and Anger through autobiographical recall …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549564
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start of high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003826571
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095928
We introduce a simple procedure to be used for selecting the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 games. We start with an axiomatic description of a function that may capture players' beliefs. Various proposals connected with the concept of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439356
We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral ….S.A. than anywhere else. -- conditional cooperation ; public goods ; experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729297
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003465123
We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesianpersuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise (a la Blackwell) is always harmful forthe information designer, i.e., the sender. We show that in general this is not the case. Weprovide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854480
Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014391609
Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014373468