Showing 1 - 3 of 3
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969197
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012019513
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824432