Starting from the Contribution from Ronald Coase, the modern theoretical literature tends to identify the firm with the hierarchic coordination of the workforce, opposed to the coordination of the production factors operated by the market. Other authors prefer to concentrate on the entrepreneur...

This paper provides an empirical assessment of long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply contracts to determine optimal contract duration. We study the trade-off between contracting costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk of being bound in an inflexible agreement in uncertain...

It is well-known that a seller imposed non-discrimination clause can soften downstream price competition by constraining opportunistic pricing behavior on the part of an upstream monopolist seller. But what about about market settings in which there exists a pivotal buyer? We show that in the...

In many capital-intensive markets, sellers sign long-term contracts with buyers before committing to sunk cost investments. Ex-ante contracts mitigate the risk of under-investment arising from ex-post bargaining. However, contractual rigidities reduce the ability of firms to respond flexibly to...

We rely on transaction cost economics and the contingency stream of organization theory to answer two related questions. First, when contracting for complex services, do governments design contracts for flexibility? Second, is the contingency perspective relevant to understanding contract...

We study the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer such that the seller makes relation-specific investments in each period. We show that where, under spot transaction, formal contracts have no value because of the cooperative nature of investment, writing a simple...

Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we...

Contract today increasingly links entrepreneurial innovations to the efforts and finance necessary to transform ideas into value. In this Chapter, we describe the match between a form of contract that "braids" formal and informal contractual elements in novel ways and the process by which...

A large Brazilian agribusiness lender introduces a new contracting technology: grain warehouses. Using runner-up warehouse locations as a control group, I find that lenders' access to these warehouses permits a new debt contract, i.e. a barter credit repayable in grain, increases borrowers' debt...

Do contractual institutions and a country's level of trust interact in their impact on the international make-or-buy decision? By analyzing explicit and implicit contracting in a unified framework, I show that better formal contractibility may both facilitate and hinder relational contracting on...