provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But … trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …

contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty …

contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become … this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts, even preferring a pure bonus contract over a contract that combines the … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit …

be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …

relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a … dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task …

. -- White-Collar Employees ; Implicit Contract ; Explicit Bonus ; Reputational Equilibrium …

. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the principal is assured that his contract for each agent is implemented …, and analyze the principal's delegation choice to authorize a senior agent to contract with a junior agent based on reports … decentralized contract are driven by their incentives to share risk, and by their incentives to re-allocate their effort choices, i …

-v based compensation on firms' credit rating. We find the incentive induced by p-v based compensation carry out to the credit …