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This paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116026
After a contract is signed, contracting partners may engage in opportunistic behavior that circumvents the original … contract). We use an incomplete contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of such behavior are … conditions for the optimality of incomplete contracts, a simple characterization of the second-best contract, and some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985153
Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
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This paper argues that academics, politicians, and the media have six commonly held but misguided beliefs about corporate governance. While Armstrong, Guay, and Weber (2010) discuss some of these misconceptions, a wider recognition that these beliefs are actually “myths” is important. They...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008695774
contract is a (secondbest) optimal screening device for firm A to screen out free-riders. With the additional constraint of … incentive to renegotiate the contract ex post. We also propose empirical strategies for identifying the three likely causes of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200195
Employees learn from performing their tasks, and in the process they accumulate potentially portable human capital. If companies cannot commit to specific task assignments, they may have an incentive to assign workers to tasks that reduce the cost of retaining them but do not maximize their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854754
This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838
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