This dissertation consists of three experimental studies that aim at contributing to a better understanding of behavior within contractual relationships—in particular, if information asymmetries, incentive issues and a lack of formal institutions make exchange more difficult and risky....

Contracts may be subject to strategic default, particularly if public enforcement institutions are weak. In a lab experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may...

Agri-food systems in developing countries are undergoing a rapid transformation, characterized by modernizing supply chains and the rising importance of highervalue products. Participation of smallholder farmers in the emerging modern and high-value marketing channels is considered a crucial...

Although there is a lot of evidence for the positive welfare effects of contract farming, it is not clear how to integrate farmers into contracts and how to maintain stable long-term-relationships between farmers and agri-business firms. While Contract Farming is a formal institutional...

In the last decades global food value chains have seen the need for increasing vertical coordination in order to secure quality standards. A prominent way to govern the relationships between farmers and agri-business firms are farming contracts. We study the role of trust, risk and time...