We study whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in …, whether reputation effects emerge in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over …

Watson (2007) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex … contracts do not constitute an intermediate paradigm between implementation with no renegotiation and with ex-post renegotiation …. Moreover, taking a full implementation approach, non-forcing contracts fail if and only if one goes outside of the constraints …

Watson (2002) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex …-forcing contracts do not constitute an intermediate paradigm between implementation with no renegotiation and with ex-post renegotiation …. Moreover, taking a full implementation approach, non-forcing contracts fail if and only if one goes outside of the constraints …

sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire … high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring …

post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the … contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an …-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition. …

for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the …

for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the …