Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392051
Do politico-economic systems influence how control affects motivation? We hypothesize that control aversion, meaning crowding-out of intrinsic motivation due to enforcement, has evolved less under the coercive regime of East Germany than under the liberal regime of West Germany. We test this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012312305
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012210474
We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267131
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010866215
We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatments with 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conflict with those of the original study. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008478714
This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265676
This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866534
This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051040