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Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation : evidence from gift-exchange experiments

Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred - 2024

Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014529308

Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation : evidence from gift-exchange experiments

Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014502768

Sustaining cooperation through strategic self-interested actions

Lancia, Francesco; Russo, Alessia - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 19 (2019) 2, pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026814

R&D cooperation between impatient rivals

Yao, Zhiyong; Zheng, Bingyong - In: Bulletin of economic research 68 (2016) 4, pp. 396-413

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011577915

Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring

Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106

Altruists Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model

Eshel, Ilan; Samuelson, Larry; Shaked, Avner - ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution …

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636451

ALTRUISM, EGOISM AND GROUP COHESION IN A LOCAL INTERACTION MODEL

Martínez, José A. García - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2004

In this paper we have introduced and parameterized the concept of ?group cohesion? in a model of local interaction with a population divided into groups. This allows us to control the level of ?isolation? of these groups: We thus analyze if the degree of group cohesion is relevant to achieve an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515929

Whom can you trust? : reputation and cooperation in networks

King, Maia - 2017

Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773641

Group Size and Cooperation among Strangers

Duffy, John; Xie, Huan - Department of Economics, Concordia University - 2012

We study how group size affects cooperation in an infinitely repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n less than or equal to M are randomly and anonymously matched from a fixed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010614865

The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation Based Choice

Bergh, Andreas; Engseld, Peter - 2006

have preferences over possible opponents. We model reputation as a noisy observation of actual propensity to cooperate and … illustrate how reputation based choice of opponents can explain both the emergence and deterioration of cooperation. We show that … risk of damaging their reputation as nice, cooperative persons. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208482

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