benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are … can survive in such a world if they are grouped together, so that the benefits of Altruism are enjoyed primarily by other …

one's type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between … viscosity leads to a sharp increase in overall cooperation rates and in addition positively affects the subjects' intrinsic …

The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people … illustrate how reputation based choice of opponents can explain both the emergence and deterioration of cooperation. We show that … empirical and experimental evidence of cooperation is consistent with our hypothesis that people behave so as to minimize the …

We analyze a cooperation game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponents' propensity … two agents agree to play. Pareto optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly reflects … propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for reputation …

depends on both the individual and the context. For example, non-zero-sum cooperation (e.g. in social dilemmas like the … favor social dilemma cooperation regardless of gender, but only favor DG giving among women. Here I present meta …-analytic evidence in support of this prediction. In 31 studies examining social dilemma cooperation (N=13,447), I find that promoting …

The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people … illustrate how reputation based choice of opponents can explain both the emergence and deterioration of cooperation. We show that … empirical and experimental evidence of cooperation is consistent with our hypothesis that people behave so as to minimize the …

We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of … takes place when two agents agree to play. Socially optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly … reflects propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for …

We analyze a cooperation game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponents’ propensity … two agents agree to play. Pareto optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly reflects … propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for reputation …