The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people are randomly matched against each other in repeated games. In this paper we discuss the implications of allowing agents to have preferences over possible opponents. We model...

We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponent's propensity to play dove, called reputation, and form preferences over opponents based on their reputation. A game takes place when two agents agree to play. Socially...

We analyze a cooperation game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponents’ propensity to cooperate, called reputation, and form preferences over opponents based on their reputation. A game takes place when two agents agree to play. Pareto optimal cooperation is...

It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of...