Competition among firms has been suggested to reflect the ruthless logic of Darwinian selection: a free market is a struggle for survival, in which successful firms survive and unsuccessful ones die. This view appears to bolster three pillars of neoclassical economics: (1) that economic actors...

We develop a theory of economic organization grounded in the naturalistic paradigm currently emerging at the intersection of biology and the behavioral and social sciences. The crux of this approach is the recognition that an understanding of the evolutionary origins of human organizational...

Decline and break-up of institutionalized cooperation, at all levels, has occurred frequently. Some of its concomitants, such as international migration, have become topical in the globalized world. Aspects of the phenomenon have also become known as failing states. However, the focus in most...

In arguing that borders not only should be understood as economic barriers to trade, but also <p> as cultural barriers to interaction, this paper attempts to operationalize a broader interpretation of <p> borders with regards to economic cross-cultural integration. Thus, by formalizing the cultural <p>...</p></p></p>

Yang et al. (2007) show that assortative matching mechanisms can induce a high level of cooperation to prevail in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments, but societies may also head to an all-defection state rapidly. Here, we additionally provide information on income distribution and show...

In this essay I discuss the role of cooperation in the process of innovation. I argue for a reorientation of the way we conceptualize economic behavior, taking account of the centrality of cooperation as a driving force of economic dynamism. I also seek to distinguish between different forms of...

This article aims to clarify the case and the mechanism where sanction or punishment by institution can deliver the evolution of cooperation. Compared to peer sanctioning, institutional sanctioning may be sensitive to players' attitude toward players who do not pre-commit punishment. Departed...

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9442.00182/abstract">'Journal of Economics'</A> 102(1) 23-39.<P>We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners...</p></a>