We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and...

One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notion establishes connections between the solution vectors of a cooperative game and those of its reduced game. The last one is obtained from the initial game by removing one or more players and by...

The study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games possessing a nonempty core and for which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by Driessen and Tijs (Methods Oper. Res. 46:395–406, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1983</CitationRef>) and Driessen (OR Spectrum 7:19–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>). However, until recently appealing abstract and practical examples of...</citationref></citationref>