characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more … payoffs at each date according to the coalition structure prevailing at the time. We use this model to nest two broad … approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties …

coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings …

We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018 …

sovereignty, meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the … coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and coalitional deviations. We argue further that dominance has to be replaced by … matchings that belong to the core. We also show that the pairwise and coalitional analogues of the level-1 farsighted set yield …

existing 2-player coalitions, a new 2-player coalition in which they are mutually better off. A solution is stable if it has no … stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the … the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no …