We explore the determinants of the payoffs an individual player may obtain in the equilibria of superadditive n-player coalitional games with transferable payoff. We provide conditions necessary and sufficient for the lower bound on a player's equilibrium payoff to coincide with his reservation...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

The paper explores organizations designed to influence a group to choose specific alternatives from a set of possible choices. The perspective is that of an administrator that has personal objectives not shared by the group and can dictate organization but not group choice. The design works...

This paper considers two games, a stag hunt and a prisoners' dilemma. Each game features non-binding, costless, and free-form pre-play communication. I focus on players who verbally first suggest cooperation in each game. I study experimentally whether the frequency of verbal initiative-taking...

The siting of noxious facilities is usually a reason for conflict: as a society we want them, but as individuals (and often as communities) we do not want them close by. Faced with this problem, economists have used several methods such as lotteries, auctions or insurance policies. However, all...

In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway...

Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is difficult to monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment...

Market integration is seen as a complementary measure to decarbonize energy markets. In the context of power markets, this translates into regions that coordinate to maximize welfare in the power market with respect to a climate target. Yet, the maximization of overall welfare through...

Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others'...

We examine the role of cooperative preferences, beliefs, and punishments to uncover potential cross-societal differences in voluntary cooperation. Using one-shot public goods experiments in four comparable subject pools from the US and the UK (two similar Western societies) and Morocco and...