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Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

Ehlers, Lars H. (contributor); … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003473055

A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - In: Economics letters 95 (2007) 1, pp. 85-90

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003448158

Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

Barberà, Salvador; Ehlers, Lars H. - In: Social choice and welfare 37 (2011) 4, pp. 559-574

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009356253

Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations

Barberà, Salvador; Beviá, Carmen; Ponsatí, Clara - In: Games and economic behavior 91 (2015), pp. 237-257

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011385779

A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002746116

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Gerber, Anke; Barberà, Salvador - 2005

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that solutions to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be resting points for a game in the way stable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065652